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7 The Impact of the U.S. Safeguard Measures on Northeast 
Asian Producers: General Equilibrium Assessments* 
  
Hiro Lee and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 
  
7.1 Introduction 
In the last three and a half decades, the U.S. steel industry has been protected by a 
variety of import relief measures, including voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs), the 
trigger price mechanism (TPM), and anti-dumping and countervailing duties. As noted in 
Chapter 6, the imposition of safeguard measures in March 2002 on 11 steel product 
categories in the forms of higher tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)1 was the latest of a 
series of U.S. protection of its steel industry and escalated the efforts of the U.S. 
government to restrict steel imports.2 The safeguards were not imposed on the members of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada and Mexico, and the great 
majority of developing countries. Some of the developing countries that are not exempted 
include China, Korea and Brazil, which are major steel producers in the world.3 The U.S. 
government intended to impose the safeguard measures for a period of three years, but in 
July 2003 the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel ruled that these measures 
were in violation of WTO rules and in November 2003 the WTO Appellate Body upheld 
the major findings of the panel ruling.4 In December 2003 the United States decided to 
terminate the safeguard measures.  
The recent U.S. protection policy might have temporarily reduced its steel imports 
from the Northeast Asian countries, the European Union (EU) and other non-exempt 
countries. At the same time, the U.S. action has harmed its automobile, heavy equipment, 
construction and other steel-consuming industries by raising the cost of intermediate input 
(e.g., Francois and Baughman, 2001; USITC, 2003). Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003) 
estimate that the safeguards increased the average domestic steel price in the United States 
by 3.3 percent. Francois and Baughman (2001) suggest that the provision of import relief 
                                                 
* The copyedited version of this paper has been published in H. Lee, E. D. Ramstetter, and O. Movshuk 
(eds.), Restructuring of the Steel Industry in Northeast Asia, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 
pp. 152-176. We are grateful to William E. James, Oleksandr Movshuk, and particularly Eric D. 
Ramstetter for helpful comments on an earlier version. We are solely responsible for any errors that 
remain. 
153
remedies for steel would impose cost of $1.9-4.0 billion a year on consumers and reduce 
U.S. national income by $500 million to $1.4 billion a year. U.S. steel producers would 
gain $242-496 million, but these gains would not re-establish the U.S. steel industry to be 
profitable. USITC (2003) estimates that the effect of the safeguards using a static single-
country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and finds that the aggregate effect 
ranges from a welfare gain of $65.6 million to a welfare loss of $110.0 million, with a 
central estimate of a welfare loss of $41.6 million. It also estimates that the capital income 
of the steel industry would increase by $240 million (3.03 percent) and that of the steel-
consuming industries would decrease by $601 million (0.01 percent). 
Using a dynamic multi-country CGE model, we evaluate the effects of U.S. 
safeguards on economic welfare, real GDP, steel trade, sectoral output and unit cost of the 
United States and its trading partners, with particular attention to those of Japan, China, 
Korea and Taiwan, over the period 2002-2005. Unlike the model used by USITC (2003) 
that can only evaluate the aggregate and sectoral effects within the United States, our 
model can assess the effects on U.S. trading partners. In addition, by using a dynamic 
model, we can more accurately specify the safeguard duties that are different between the 
first and second year. The next section provides the trends in U.S. steel imports by trading 
partners during the 1970-2001 period. An overview of the model is given in section 7.3, 
followed by a brief description of the scenario in section 7.4. Assessments of general 
equilibrium effects of the U.S. safeguards are provided in section 7.5. The final section 
summarizes the main findings of this chapter. 
7.2 Trends in U.S. Steel Imports by Trading Partners, 1970-2001 
Figure 7.1 provides the trends in the shares of U.S. steel imports from selected 
trading partners over the period 1970-2001. Several noticeable trends are readily 
observable from this figure. First, the share of U.S. steel imports from Japan declined 
drastically from about 50 percent in 1976 to under 10 percent in 2000-2001. The decline in 
the Japanese share over the 1976-92 period were largely attributable to two factors: (1) the 
introduction of TPM from 1978-82, where minimum reference prices for imported steel 
were instituted,5 and (2) VRAs were in effect from 1984-1992. Second, the share of 
imports from the EU also declined significantly – from 45 percent in 1971 to 26 percent in 
2001. Third, although Korea’s steel exports to the United States increased rapidly during 
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the 1970-83 period, its exports to the U.S. relative to other trading partners showed a slight 
downward trend during 1983-1997 before recovering in 1998-2001. Fourth, China, now 
the world’s largest steel producer in tonnage, started to export its steel to the United States 
in the mid-1980s, but the share has remained relatively small (1-4 percent in 1990-2001). 
Fifth, Taiwan started exporting steel to the United States in the mid-1970s after China 
Steel began production in 1974, and it accounted for 1-4 percent of U.S. imports during 
1978-2001. Finally, as already indicated in Chapter 6, U.S. imports from Japan and Korea 
surged in 1998 as these countries tried to shift large shares of their exports to the United 
States when demand in Asia tumbled. However, largely because of the dramatic increase 
in U.S. anti-dumping suits in late 1998, particularly against imports from Japan, U.S. 
imports from Japan and Korea declined rapidly in 1999 (see section 6.2 of Chapter 6). 
Over the 1980-2001 period, the shares of U.S. steel imports from Japan, Korea, China and 
Taiwan declined from 46 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1990 and 20 percent in 2001. 
[Insert Figure 7.1 around here] 
Given the shares of U.S. imports from Northeast Asian and European countries 
have declined over time, which countries have been able to increase the market shares in 
the United States? As Figure 7.1 clearly indicates, U.S. steel imports from Canada and 
Mexico have increased significantly since the mid-1980s. The NAFTA partners accounted 
for over 25 percent of U.S. import share in 2001, up sharply from 12 percent in 1985. The 
share of imports from Brazil increased from 3 percent in 1980 to 8 percent in 2001, 
whereas the share of CIS countries (primarily Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) rapidly 
increased from under 1 percent in 1992 to 10 percent in 1998, before falling considerably 
in the subsequent years.6 Overall, the clear trends of increasing shares of U.S. imports 
from the NAFTA partners and Brazil and decreasing shares of the imports from the 
Northeast Asian countries and the EU have been revealed. 
7.3 Overview of the Model 
The model used in this study is a dynamic global CGE model developed by van der 
Mensbrugghe (2001). In the base model, all sectors are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive and operate under constant returns to scale. However, we later relax these 
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assumptions by specifying imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in the 
steel industry. Production in each sector is modeled by a series of nested CES production 
functions, which are intended to represent the different substitution and complementarity 
relations across various inputs in each sector. The CES nests for production archetype in 
goods and services other than crops and livestock are depicted in Figure 7.2.7 At the top 
nest, production is formed by the combination of aggregate intermediate demand other 
than energy (ND) and value added plus energy (VA). The second nest consists of two 
nodes. The first node decomposes aggregate intermediate demand into sectoral demand for 
goods and services. The second node decomposes VA between demand for labor (L) and 
demand for human capital, physical capital, energy and sector-specific factor composite 
(HKTE). The third and subsequent nodes are decomposed by a similar fashion, as 
illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
[Insert Figure 7.2 around here] 
Labor can have three different skill levels: unskilled, skilled and highly skilled. 
The first two are substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation function as a single 
labor bundle. Highly skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical plus human 
capital bundle. 
In each period, the supply of primary factors—capital, labor and land—is generally 
predetermined. The supply of land is assumed to be sensitive to the contemporaneous 
price of land, however. Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors. 
Thus rates of return are sector-specific, but sectoral land supply reacts to changes in 
relative rates of return. Some of the natural resource sectors also have a sector-specific 
factor whose contemporaneous supply is price sensitive. The model includes adjustment 
rigidities. An important feature is the distinction between old and new capital goods. In 
addition, capital is assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differences in the 
marketability of capital goods across sectors. Labor and population growth are exogenous. 
Labor within each skill category is perfectly mobile across sectors. 
All income generated by economic activity is assumed to be distributed to 
consumers. A single representative consumer (or household) allocates optimally his/her 
disposable income among the consumer goods and saving. The consumption/saving 
decision is static: saving is treated as a good and its amount is determined simultaneously 
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with the demands for the other goods. The price of saving is set arbitrarily equal to the 
average price of consumer goods. Investment is driven by aggregate saving, or the sum of 
household, government and foreign savings. We assume that foreign saving is exogenous 
and that the ratio of government expenditures to GDP remains constant in each region 
over time. 
Products are differentiated by region of origin and modeled as imperfect substitutes. 
On the import side, this is reflected by the implementation of the so-called Armington 
assumption, where a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification is used to 
incorporate imperfect substitution of imported goods with respect to domestically 
produced goods. A symmetric specification is used to model export supply, the latter being 
implemented with constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions. Trade measures 
are fully bilateral and include both export and import taxes/subsidies. Trade and transport 
margins are also included; therefore world prices reflect the difference between FOB and 
CIF pricing.
The model is calibrated to a given baseline from 1997 to 2005. The per capita GDP 
growth rates are broadly consistent with the World Bank’s forecast. Productivity is 
calibrated in the baseline to achieve the desired GDP trends. Several assumptions 
underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural productivity is exogenous, user-
determined and varies across regions. Manufacturing productivity growth is assumed to be 
higher than services productivity growth. An economywide productivity factor is 
calibrated to achieve the given GDP target, and productivity growth is assumed to be 
labor-augmenting.  
Most of the data used in the model come from version 5 of the GTAP database, 
which provides 1997 data on input-output, value added, final demand, bilateral trade, tax 
and subsidy data for 66 regions and 57 sectors.8 For the purpose of the present study, the 
database is aggregated into 14 regions and 17 sectors as shown in Table 7.1. The regional 
detail focuses on Northeast Asian steel producers as well as other major U.S. trading 
partners in steel. The sectoral detail focuses on steel and its downstream industries, such as 
metal products, general machinery, motor vehicles, other transport equipment and 
construction.
[Insert Table 7.1 around here] 
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In the alternative specification, we model the steel industry to be imperfectly 
competitive by introducing a price markup over average cost. Increasing returns are 
calibrated to a cost disadvantage ratio given by 
TC
FC
AC
MCACCDR ??? (7.1) 
where AC, MC, FC and TC are average, marginal, fixed and total costs, respectively. For 
illustrative purpose, we set both the price markup and cost disadvantage ratio to be 5 
percent. 
Two caveats should be borne in mind when we evaluate the effects of U.S. steel 
protection in the next section. First, as noted above, we later relax the assumptions of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale for the steel industry, but imperfect 
competition is based on a simple specification where the price markup is exogenous. 
Although it is more realistic to assume that there are strategic interactions among the firms, 
it is extremely difficult to model them in a general equilibrium framework. Second, the 
model assumes full utilization of capital, which is probably not a reasonable assumption. 
There appears to be significant overcapacity of steel production in many countries.9 When 
capital is fully utilized, an increase in output of steel raises the rental rate of capital, 
thereby increasing the marginal cost of production in the steel industry. By contrast, when 
capital is considerably underutilized, an increase in output is unlikely to raise the rental 
rate of capital. In other words, the greater the extent of underutilization of capital, the 
smaller will be an increase in the marginal cost (or the larger will be a reduction in the 
marginal cost under increasing returns to scale) resulting from an expansion of output. 
Thus, the costs of protection are likely to become lower in countries where steel output 
increases, whereas they are likely to become higher in countries where steel output 
contracts.
7.4 Policy Scenario 
Table 7.2 summarizes U.S. safeguard measures for 11 categories of steel products. 
The initial decision was to impose TRQs on slabs and higher duties on the other 10 
product categories for a period of three years starting in March 2002. Then the quota limit 
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on slabs would be increased and the tariff rates on the other product categories would be 
reduced progressively each year. For example, tariffs of 30 percent in 2002, 24 percent in 
2003, and 18 percent in 2004 were to be imposed on certain finished flat products (plate, 
hot-rolled sheets, cold-rolled sheets and coated sheets), hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar 
and tin mill products.10 However, because the safeguards were terminated in December 
2003, the measures for the first two years are listed in Table 7.2. 
[Insert Table 7.2 around here] 
In order to assess the consequences of the safeguard measures, it is necessary to 
compute their tariff equivalents on U.S. imports of iron and steel [Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) sector 67] because the GTAP database does not provide data 
on more disaggregated steel products. We compute an increase in the tariff rate on steel 
imports from region r as follows: 
? ???
i
tiirtr tt ,,, ? (7.2) 
where ?tr,t is the average increase in the U.S. tariff rate on imports of iron and steel from 
region r in year t, ?r,i is the share of r’s steel product category i in total U.S. steel imports 
from region r in 2000, and ?ti,t is the increase in the tariff rate on product i in year t.
Estimates of increases in the U.S. tariff rates on iron and steel (SITC 67) resulting 
from its safeguard measures are provided in Table 7.3. For slabs we assumed that tariff 
equivalents of TRQs were 2 percent in the first year and 1.5 percent in the second year. It 
is worth noting that most developing and transitional countries were on the exclusion list. 
However, China, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia were included in the safeguard action. For 
certain products, some developing and transitional countries were included: Brazil for 
slabs and flat products; India, Thailand and Romania for carbon flanges; Moldova, Turkey 
and Venezuela for rebar; and Thailand for welded pipe. 
[Insert Table 7.3 around here] 
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7.5 Quantitative Assessments of the U.S. Safeguards 
In sections A-C below, the effects of the U.S. safeguards are evaluated using the 
base model with the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale in all 
industries. In section D, we relax these assumptions for the steel industry and compare the 
results obtained under increasing returns with those obtained under constant returns. 
A.  Effects on Economic Welfare and Real GDP 
Aggregate welfare gains and losses summarize the extent trade distortions are 
hindering growth prospects and the ability of economies to use the gains to help those 
whose income could potentially decline. We compare the U.S. safeguard scenario with the 
baseline situation for the years 2002-2005. Economic welfare is measured by Hicksian 
equivalent variation (EV), which represents the income consumers would be willing to 
forego to achieve post-policy well-being (up) compared to baseline well-being (ub) at 
baseline prices (pb):
? ? ? ?bbpb upEupEEV ,, ?? (7.3) 
where E represents the expenditure function to achieve utility level u given a vector of 
prices p (superscript b represents baseline levels, and p the post-reform levels). The model 
uses the extended linear expenditure system (ELES), which incorporates savings in the 
consumer’s utility function (Lluch, 1973; Howe, 1975). The ELES expenditure function is 
easy to evaluate at each point in time.  
The welfare results are summarized in Table 7.4. For the years 2002 and 2003 
when the safeguards were in place, U.S. welfare was estimated to be $161-192 million 
higher than in the baseline where no safeguards were imposed. However, after the 
safeguard measures were terminated, U.S. welfare would become slightly lower than in 
the baseline (–$34 million in 2004 and –$31 million in 2005). Although not shown in the 
table, detailed results indicate that the changes in the terms of trade played the principal 
role in these welfare changes. A relatively large size of the U.S. steel market implies that a 
reduction in U.S. steel imports resulting from the safeguard duties would lower the world 
price of steel. As a result, the terms of trade for the United States and other net importers 
of steel improved while those for net exporters of steel deteriorated during the time when 
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the safeguards were in place. In other words, the burden of the new U.S. tariffs was 
partially born by foreign producers.11
[Insert Table 7.4 around here] 
As expected, most of the non-exempt countries incurred welfare losses. According 
to our results, the EU was the biggest loser in absolute terms with a reduction in its EV by 
$214-240 million in 2002-2003, followed by Japan ($77-89 million), Korea ($54-60 
million) and the former Soviet Union ($49-58 million). In percentage terms, Korea 
incurred the greatest loss of 0.012 percent while Japan and Taiwan’s welfare fell by 0.003-
0.004 percent compared with the baseline values in 2003. China did not suffer any welfare 
losses because its exports to the United States were quite small and it has been a net 
importer of steel. 
In contrast to most of the non-exempt countries, economic welfare of the exempt 
countries increased during the U.S. impositions of safeguard measures on steel imports 
from the non-exempt countries. In particular, Canada and Mexico experienced increases in 
their EV of $64-77 million in 2002-2003. This resulted from increases in their steel 
exports to the United States, thereby stimulating overall demand, as well as from an 
improvement in their terms of trade. 
Table 7.5 summarizes the impact of the safeguard measures on real GDP. Most 
notably, real GDP of the United States was estimated to be $117-118 million lower in 
2002-2003 than in the baseline. This suggests that an increase in output of steel was more 
than offset by reductions in output of other goods and services in the United States. In 
percentage terms, the reduction in U.S. real GDP in 2003 was only 0.001 percent. For 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, reductions in their real GDPs were smaller than the reductions 
in their EVs, as were for the EU, other OECD countries, Brazil and the former Soviet 
Union. In contrast, gains in real GDPs for Canada and Mexico, Central and Eastern 
Europe and the rest of the world were smaller than the gains in their EVs. 
[Insert Table 7.5 around here] 
Overall, the effects of U.S. steel protection on economic welfare and real GDP 
were estimated to be extremely small. This might be partly caused by the fact that the 
volume of imports affected by the U.S. protection is quite small relative to the world trade, 
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but it also highlights how small the steel industry is in economic terms. The results might 
also explain why there are relatively few complaints about the costs of protectionism in 
the steel industry. 
B.  Effects on Trade Flows 
Table 7.6 presents trade flow adjustments in steel resulting from the U.S. 
imposition of safeguards. Figures are given in percent deviations from the baseline 
scenario for the year 2003. To what extent Northeast Asian and other non-exempt 
countries’ steel exports to the United States were reduced? Would steel exports of the 
NAFTA partners and other countries on the exclusion list increase? Would major 
Northeast Asian steel exporters, such as Japan and Korea, increase their exports to the EU 
and East Asian markets to compensate for the reductions in their market shares in the 
United States? Answers to these questions are of particular interests to policy makers. 
[Insert Table 7.6 around here] 
The percentage changes in U.S. steel imports by trading partner are highly 
correlated with the changes in the U.S. tariff rates on steel imports summarized in Table 
7.3. The tariff equivalents of the U.S. safeguard measures were estimated to be highest in 
Korea, followed by Taiwan, the EU, Japan, other OECD, the former Soviet Union and 
China. The projected percent reductions in U.S. imports relative to the baseline in 2003 
were largest (in absolute terms) for Korea (–25%), followed by Taiwan (–22%), the EU   
(–19%), Japan (–17%), other OECD (–13%), the former Soviet Union (–11%) and China 
(–9%), the exactly same order as the increases in the U.S. tariff rates on steel by trading 
partner.
The exclusions of the NAFTA partners and most developing and transitional 
countries imply that the price of imports from these countries relative to the price of 
imports from the non-exempt countries for U.S. steel consumers declined in 2002-2003. 
This led to increases in U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico, Latin America except 
Brazil, Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of the world by 10-11 percent, thus largely 
offsetting the fall in the total U.S. steel imports.12
According to our results, the U.S. safeguards did not induce the Northeast Asian 
countries to increase their exports to the EU or East Asian markets. Instead, their exports 
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to Canada and Mexico increased slightly. Other than U.S. imports, adjustments in bilateral 
trade flows were extremely small. In the aggregate, the U.S. steel imports were estimated 
to decline by 5.9 percent (the last row of Table 7.6). The total steel exports of Japan, China, 
Korea and Taiwan fell by 1.4, 0.2, 1.9 and 0.7 percent, respectively, whereas those of 
Canada and Mexico, Latin American other than Brazil, Central and Eastern Europe and 
the rest of the world increased by 0.8, 1.1, 0.1 and 0.6 percent, respectively (the last 
column of Table 7.6). Thus, although the safeguards affected U.S. bilateral trade with its 
trading partners significantly, their effect on global trade was limited. 
C.  Effects on Sectoral Output and Average Cost 
The impact of the U.S. safeguard measures is expected to vary significantly across 
sectors. In particular, the industries that use steel intensively as an intermediate input are 
likely to be adversely affected by the safeguard duties. To what extent the steel-consuming 
industries in the United States and the Northeast Asian countries have been affected by the 
U.S. safeguards is of great concerns to policy makers in these countries. 
Table 7.7 provides real output results for the year 2003 on steel and major steel-
consuming industries—metal products, general machinery, motor vehicles, other transport 
equipment and construction—resulting from the temporary safeguards. Real output of 
steel in the United States was estimated to increase by 1.3 percent, whereas that of Canada 
and Mexico would increase by 2.1 percent, mainly driven by a sharp increase in the 
exports to the United States. The contraction in output of Northeast Asian producers was 
very small, ranging from –0.1 percent (China) to –0.8 percent (Korea).
[Insert Table 7.7 around here] 
According to our results, the U.S. safeguards caused output contractions in the 
metal products, general machinery, motor vehicles, other transport equipment and 
construction sectors in the United States although the impact on these industries was 
extremely small. By contrast, it led to output expansions in the steel-consuming industries 
other than construction in Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan, even though the impact was 
again very small. 
The effects on output of the steel-consuming industries were largely attributable to 
changes in their average costs. Table 7.8 presents the effects on average costs of steel and 
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the downstream industries resulting from the U.S. safeguards. In the United States, the 
average costs of steel-consuming industries rose mainly because the price of steel 
increased. On the contrary, the average costs of the same industries in the non-exempt 
countries fell. Had the United States covered a much wider range of steel products or set 
considerably higher tariff rates, they might have lead to significant deteriorations in the 
international competitiveness of U.S. steel-consuming industries. 
[Insert Table 7.8 around here] 
D.  Increasing Returns to Scale 
In any CGE models, simulation results are sensitive to the assumptions of the 
model. For example, previous studies (e.g., Harris, 1984; Brown and Stern, 1989; Francois 
and Roland-Holst, 1997) have shown that the gains from trade liberalization could be 
significantly larger when some of the sectors are characterized by imperfect competition 
and scale economies. Thus, the costs of the U.S. safeguards are likely to become higher if 
we relax the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRS) and 
instead incorporate imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (IRS) into the 
model.
Table 7.9 summarizes the results on economic welfare, real GDP, and U.S. steel 
imports under CRS and IRS in the steel industry. In the latter case, a 5 percent price 
markup over average cost and the cost disadvantage ratio (see equation 7.1) of 5 percent 
are introduced in the steel industry. In all the other industries, we still maintain the 
assumptions of perfect competition and CRS. 
[Insert Table 7.9 around here] 
As expected, the magnitudes of changes in economic welfare are generally larger 
under IRS than under CRS. An absolute change in steel output becomes greater when 
marginal cost declines with output. Thus, in countries where steel output expands (e.g., the 
United States, Canada and Mexico), larger increases in steel production have a positive 
effect on real GDP even though the change in real GDP is still negative in the United 
States because of output contractions in the steel-consuming sectors. Combined with the 
improvements in the terms of trade for these countries, the welfare gains would become 
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larger for the United States and the countries that were exempted from the U.S. 
safeguards.13 By contrast, in countries where steel output contracts (e.g., Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and the EU), greater reductions in steel output have a negative effect on real GDP. 
Combined with the deteriorations in the terms of trade for most of these countries, the 
welfare losses would become greater for most of the non-exempt countries. Because 
additional losses in economic welfare and real GDP are greater than additional gains in 
these variables under IRS, the world as a whole would incur greater welfare and real GDP 
losses from the U.S. safeguards when the steel industry is characterized by imperfect 
competition and IRS (the last row of Table 7.9). 
Changes in U.S. imports of steel by trading partner are also magnified under IRS. 
For example, the reductions in imports from the Northeast Asian countries would increase 
from 9-25 percent under CRS to 11-30 percent under IRS. Similarly, U.S. imports from 
Canada and Mexico would increase from 10 percent to 13 percent. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided quantitative assessments of the temporary U.S. 
safeguards in 2002-2003 using a 14-region, 17-sector dynamic CGE model. The results 
suggest that the effects of the safeguards on economic welfare, real GDP, trade flows, and 
real output of steel and the downstream industries were very small. According to our 
results, the U.S. welfare marginally increased during the two years when the safeguards 
were in effect because of an improvement in its terms of trade. By contrast, U.S. real GDP 
was estimated to decline by $117-118 million in 2002-2003 largely because an increase in 
the price of steel would reduce output of the steel-consuming industries. Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan incurred some welfare losses, but they were extremely small in percentage terms. 
China did not suffer any welfare losses as its exports to the United States were very small 
and it experienced a small improvement in the terms of trade. The reductions in real GDP 
were negligible for Japan, Korea and Taiwan as the expansions of the steel-consuming 
industries almost offset the contraction of the steel industry. 
U.S. steel imports from the Northeast Asian countries declined by 9-25 percent, 
and those from the EU, other OECD countries and the former Soviet Union fell by 11-19 
percent. However, U.S. imports from the NAFTA partners and other countries on the 
exclusion list increased by 10-11 percent, largely offsetting the reductions in the total U.S. 
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steel imports. Real output of steel in the United States was predicted to increase by 1.3 
percent, whereas that of Northeast Asian producers contract by 0.1-0.8 percent. Canada 
and Mexico would realize a relatively large gain in real output, mainly driven by a sharp 
increase in their exports to the United States. The effects on output of the steel-consuming 
industries are negative in the United States and positive in the Northeast Asian countries, 
but they are extremely small. Under the alternative specification where the steel industry 
was characterized by imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, the effects 
became larger, but still extremely small in percentage terms. These results suggest that the 
impact of the U.S. safeguards was minimal. 
The magnitudes of our results are significantly smaller than those obtained by 
Francois and Baughman (2001), who estimated that U.S. GDP would fall by $500 million 
to $1.4 billion. This was because they evaluated the effects of the imposition of 9.2-20.7 
percent tariffs on steel imports, which were of much higher tariff rates than used in our 
study. They also included only Canada and Mexico on the exclusion list although the great 
majority of developing countries were excluded from the U.S. safeguards. 
In this chapter, we attempted to estimate the impact of the temporary safeguards 
that were in effect in 2002-2003. Thus, no attempts were made to assess the effects of the 
protection of U.S. steel industry that existed prior to 2002, which were much more 
substantial and long-lasting. The effects of the safeguards were likely to be extremely 
small as we estimated, but the past U.S. protection policies might have had substantial 
effects on the bilateral trade flows in steel, as well as the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the steel and the steel-consuming industries in the United States and Northeast Asia. 
Notes
1. In the tariff-rate quota scheme, a given tariff rate is applied to imports up to a
specified quantity (i.e., the quota), and then a higher tariff rate is applied to imports
over the quota.
2. Detailed information on Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Global Safeguard
Investigations) is available at the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)
website (http://www.usitc.gov/us201.htm).
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3. While safeguards are imposed only on slabs and flat products for Brazil, theses are
Brazil’s major exported steel products.
4. The countries/regions that challenged the U.S. measures to the WTO were the
European Union (EU), China, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and
Brazil. Claims made by the complainants are provided in World Trade Organization
(2003).
5. Crandall (1981, p. 114) estimated that given the 15 percent increase in relative import
prices of steel in 1978-1979 the TPM could have reduced the share of U.S. imports in
total steel consumption from 18 percent to 13 percent.
6. The sharp drop in U.S. imports from Russia in 1999 might be caused by a sharp
increase in its anti-dumping petitions and Russia’s export restraint agreement with the
United States (Chapter 6).
7. See van der Mensbrugghe (2001) for the CES nests for production archetypes in
crops and livestock.
8. See Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) for detailed descriptions of the GTAP database,
version 5.
9. Hufbauer and Goodrich (2001) suggest that world steel overcapacity has often
exceeded 20 percent of production during the past 30 years.
10. Over-quota shipments on slabs were imposed the same tariff rates as these product
categories. See U.S. Trade Representative (2002).
11. In his theoretical investigation, Johnson (1954) suggests a positive correlation
between country size and the optimal tariff rate.
12. Although the safeguard duties were imposed on imports of the designated steel
products from Malaysia and those of carbon flanges from Thailand, tariff equivalents
of the safeguard measures for the ASEAN countries were quite low. Thus, the relative
price of imports from ASEAN also declined, and the resulting effect on U.S. steel
imports from ASEAN was positive.
13. Using a partial equilibrium imperfect-competition model of the U.S. steel industry,
Haris (1994) has shown that tighter quotas under VRAs could lead to an improvement
in the U.S. welfare.
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Figure 7.1:
Shares of U.S. Steel Imports by Trading Partners, 1970-2001 (percent)
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Notes:
(a) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
(b) Canada and Mexico. 
(c) CIS countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (various years). 
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Figure 7.2: Production Nesting in the Manufacturing and Services Sectors 
XP: Output
ND: Aggregate intermediate demand VA: Value added plus energy 
XAp: Intermediate demand 
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Figure 7.2 (continued) 
Definition of variables and parameters: 
XP: Output (by vintage) 
ND: Demand for aggregate non-energy intermediate demand 
VA: Demand for labor, capital, energy, and sector-specific factor bundle 
XAp: Demand for (Armington) intermediate goods (excluding energy) 
XD: Demand for domestically produced intermediate goods
XMT: Aggregate import demand for intermediate goods 
WTF: Demand for imported intermediate goods by region of origin 
AL: Demand for aggregate labor (excluding ‘highly’ skilled)  
HKTE: Demand for human and physical capital, energy, and sector-specific factor bundle
XEp: Demand for aggregate energy bundle
HKT: Demand for human capital, physical capital, and sector-specific factor bundle 
KT: Demand for physical capital and sector-specific factor bundle 
?p: Elasticity of substitution between ND and VA
?v: Elasticity of substitution between AL and HKTE 
?l: Elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor 
?e: Elasticity of substitution between XEp and HKT
?ep: Elasticity of substitution between different type of energy 
?h: Elasticity of substitution between KT and highly skilled labor 
?k: Elasticity of substitution between physical capital and sector-specific factor 
Note: The sector-specific factor includes land in agricultural sectors and the resource base in the coal, crude 
oil, natural gas, and mining sectors. 
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Table 7.1: Regional and Sectoral Aggregation 
A.  Regional Aggregation 
Countries/Regions Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP database 
United States United States 
Japan Japan 
China China, Hong Kong 
Korea Korea 
Taiwan Taiwan 
ASEANa Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
EU-15 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
Canada and Mexico Canada, Mexico 
Other OECD Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Rest of European Free Trade Area 
Brazil Brazil 
Rest of Latin America Central America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of 
Andean Pact, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America 
Former Soviet Union Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan 
Cent. and E. Europe Hungary, Poland, Rest of Central European Associates 
Rest of the world All the other economies/regions 
B.  Sectoral Aggregation 
Sectors Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP database 
Agriculture Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Energy Coal, oil, gas, petroleum and coal products, electricity, gas manufacture and 
distribution 
Minerals Minerals 
Processed food Food products, beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles and apparel Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 
Chemical products Chemical, plastic and rubber products 
Iron and steel Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metals Nonferrous metals 
Metal products Metal products 
Machinery Machinery 
Electronic equip. Electronic equipment 
Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
Other transp. equip. Other transport equipment 
Other manufactures Wood products, paper products, publishing, non-metallic mineral products, 
other manufactures 
Construction Construction 
Transport services Sea transport, air transport, transport n.e.s. 
Other services Trade, communication, financial services, other services 
a In the GTAP database, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are aggregated into the rest of the world. 
Source: GTAP database, Version 5. 
Product category
First year Second year
1 Slab 5.4 million short tons withover-quota tariff of 30%
5.9 million short tons with
over-quota tariff of 24%
2 Finished flat products (plate, hot-
rolled sheets, cold-rolled sheets,
coated sheets)
3 Hot-rolled bar
4 Cold-finished bar
5 Rebar
6 Certain welded tubular products
7 Carbon and alloy fittings andflanges 13? tariff 10? tariff
8 Stainless steel bar
9 Stainless steel rod
10 Stainless steel wire  8? tariff  7? tariff
11 Tin mill products 30? tariff 24? tariff
Table 7.2:  U.S. Safeguard Measures by Product Category
30? tariff
15? tariff
15? tariff
Source: U.S. Trade Representative (2002).
Note: 1 short ton equals 0.90718 metric tons.
12? tariff
Measures
24? tariff
12? tariff
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Exporting region 2002 2003
Japan 7.5 6.0
China 5.2 4.2
Korea 10.3 8.3
Taiwan 9.3 7.5
ASEAN 1.2 1.0
EU-15 8.3 6.7
Canada and Mexico 0.0 0.0
Other OECD 6.3 5.0
Brazil 2.6 2.1
Rest of Latin America 0.0 0.0
Former Soviet Union 5.9 4.7
Cent. and E. Europe 0.0 0.0
Rest of world 0.0 0.0
Table 7.3:  Increases in the U.S. Tariff Rates on Iron and Steel resulting from
the Safeguard Measures (percent)
Sources: U.S. Trade Representative (2002), Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (various years), and authors' calculations.
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Region Percent changes
2002 2003 2004 2005 in 2003
United States 192.2 160.8 -33.7 -30.5 0.0018
Japan -88.8 -76.8 -7.0 -6.2 -0.0022
China 7.7 5.9 0.0 0.1 0.0005
Korea -59.7 -53.7 -5.0 -4.6 -0.0123
Taiwan -13.3 -13.0 -2.8 -2.5 -0.0042
ASEAN 2.0 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.0003
EU-15 -240.4 -214.4 -16.1 -14.6 -0.0032
Canada and Mexico 76.6 64.0 3.6 4.6 0.0068
Other OECD -16.9 -14.5 -1.0 -1.1 -0.0019
Brazil -4.4 -3.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.0006
Rest of Latin America 3.1 2.2 -0.5 -0.7 0.0003
Former Soviet Union -58.4 -48.7 -1.1 -1.3 -0.0071
Cent. and E. Europe 16.1 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0050
Rest of world 11.4 9.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0006
World total -172.7 -168.0 -63.5 -57.4 -0.0006
Source: Simulation experiments.
Absolute changes (US$ million in 1997 prices)
Table 7.4:  Effects of the U.S. Safeguards on Economic Welfare (Deviations in equivalent variations
from the baseline in respective years)
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Region Percent changes
2002 2003 2004 2005 in 2003
United States -118.1 -117.0 -37.0 -35.6 -0.0012
Japan -33.0 -28.2 -6.6 -6.4 -0.0006
China 2.3 2.5 1.1 1.0 0.0002
Korea -13.2 -13.8 -7.0 -6.8 -0.0024
Taiwan -2.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.2 -0.0009
ASEAN 4.2 4.0 0.6 0.5 0.0005
EU-15 -52.3 -50.9 -17.6 -16.9 -0.0006
Canada and Mexico 14.9 13.5 7.1 7.8 0.0011
Other OECD -1.8 -2.4 -1.7 -1.7 -0.0002
Brazil -1.5 -1.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.0002
Rest of Latin America -5.8 -4.9 -1.0 -1.1 -0.0006
Former Soviet Union -7.2 -7.8 -1.9 -2.1 -0.0009
Cent. and E. Europe 3.3 3.1 0.2 0.2 0.0009
Rest of world 5.6 5.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0002
World total -205.0 -201.7 -68.3 -65.5 -0.0006
Source: Simulation experiments.
Absolute changes (US$ million in 1997 prices)
Table 7.5:  Effects of the U.S. Safeguards on Real GDP (Deviations from the baseline in respective
years)
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